Indiana Law Journal
Volume 12

Issue 1

Article 5

10-1936

The Effect of the Standard Mortgage Clause in Insurance Policies
Harry P. Cooper Jr.
Member, Indianapolis Bar

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Housing Law Commons, and the Insurance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cooper, Harry P. Jr. (1936) "The Effect of the Standard Mortgage Clause in Insurance Policies," Indiana
Law Journal: Vol. 12 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol12/iss1/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access
by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

INDIANA LIIW JOURNAL
Ten Eyck, Horace E., 1513 Fletcher Ave, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Thompson, Charles F., R. R. 6, Lebanon, Indiana.
Tyler, Keith Woodrow, 330 S. Henderson, Bloomington, Indiana.
Uhrlaub, John C, 3001 Alexander, Fort Wayne, Indana.
Vendel, J. Robert, 1521 Ohio Blvd., Terre Haute, Indiana.
Vernor, Garth H., 1126 S. Fairfield Ave., Fort Wayne, Indiana.
Wade, Frank C. Jr., 101 Monterey, Terre Haute, Indiana.
Walton, Earl Spencer, 1015 Lincoln Way, E., Mishawaka, Indiana.
Weaver, Harry A., 308 Layman, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Wendt, Donald W., 742 E. Blackford, Evansville, Indiana.
White, Luke, Covington, Indiana.
Williams, Donald E., 1923 North St., Logansport, Indiana.
Wittrig, Robert J., 3908 College Ave, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Wright, Robert B., Rensselaer, Indiana.
Young, Howard S. Jr., 4353 N. Penn. St., Indianapolis, Indiana.
Zink, George H., 217 E. 24th St., Indianapolis, Indiana.

DEATHS
William A. Pickens, Indianapolis, Judge of Marion Superior Court
and former President of Indiana State Bar Association, age 78, died
August 15, 1936.
Fred A. Wiecking, Hartford City, Judge of the Appellate Court of
Indiana, age 43, died July 28, 1936.
Charles V. McAdams, Lafayette, age 78, died August 18, 1936.
R. C. Minton, Martinsville, age 69, died August 25, 1936.
W. S. Canfield, Indianapolis.
Herbert C. Lust, Fowler, age 55, died July 22, 1936.
Charles B. Matson, Rising Sun, age 74, died August 23, 1936.
Fred D. Butler, Peru, age 77, died September 7, 1936.
John M. Evans, age 78, Fort Wayne, died September 22, 1936.

COMMENT
THE EFFECT OF THE STANDARD MORTGAGE CLAUSE
IN INSURANCE POLICIES
By HARRY P COOPER, JR.*

The social interest in the protection of mortgagees has developed in
accordance with changes in the business and economic structure. Mortgages on property of all kinds have become so prevalent and are such a
necessity under present economic conditions that the protection of the
economic interests of mortgagees has become a very important prob0 Of the Indianapolis Bar.
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lem. 1 By 1922, one authority states, 60 per cent of the realty in the
United States was mortgaged. 2 To secure this protection, there has
been both a growth of insurance covering the mortgagee's interest, and
an increase in the measure of protection afforded him. 3
Four methods of securing protection have been commonly used:
1. A policy between the insurer and the mortgagee as insured. It is
generally recognized by the courts that both the mortgagee and the
mortgagor have an insurable interest in the mortgaged property 4 since
"a person has an insurable interest in property when he sustains such
relations with respect to it that he has a reasonable expectation, resting
on a basis of legal right, of benefit to be derived from its continued
existence, or of loss or liability from ts destruction." 5 Although this
method affords full protection to the mortgagee, it is seldom used
because of the disadvantage to the mortgagee of paying the premiums,
and the disadvantage to the insurer in the difficulty of supervising the
risk, and because of the possibility of fraudulent collusion between
the -mortgagor and mortgagee.6
2. An assignment of the policy to the mortgagee by the insured
mortgagor. By this method the protection of the mortgagee is entirely
dependent upon the conduct of the mortgagor, for when an assignment
is made without an actual transfer of the subject of the insurance,
the validity of the policy depends upon the acts or neglect of the
mortgagor. In other words, the mortgagee stands in the position
7
of his mortgagor with respect to the insurance contract.
3. A 'loss-payable clause' in the policy. Under this plan the
policy contains an endorsement as follows: "Loss, if any, payable to
mortgagee, as interest may appear, subject nevertheless to
all the conditions of this policy." Under this clause the mortgagee
is merely an appointee of the insured mortgagor, and is subject to
all the defenses to which the insured would be subject., Consequently
this method has the same disadvantages with respect to the mortgagee
as an assignment.

IThe Standard Mortgage Clause in Fire Insurance Policies (1933), 33
Col. L. Rev. 305-316.
2 Bament, The Fire Insurance Contract (1922), 199.
S The Standard Mortgage Clause in Fire Insurance Policies (1933), 33
Col. L. Rev. 305-316.
4 Huebner, Property Insurance (192S), 49; Vance, Handbook of Insurance
(1904), 417.
5 Vance, Insurance (2d. ed., 1930), 124.
6 Huebner, Property Insurance (1928), 51.
7Huebner, Property Insurance (1928), 52.
aBlinkoff, Rights of Mortgagee Under Standard Mortgage Clause in Insurance Policy (1934), 17 Cor. L. Q. 151-158; Richards, Insurance (3d. ed.t 1910),
394,
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4. A 'Standard, or Union, mortgage Clause' in the policy. This
is now the most commonly used and the best method of protecting
the interest of a mortgagee in insured property.9 The New York
Standard Mortgage Clause is the leading form of the clause and is
as follows: "Loss or damage, if any, under this policy, shall be payable
to as mortgagee (or trustee) as interest may appear, and
this insurance, as to the interest of the mortgagee (or trustee) only
therein, shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor
or owner of the within described property, nor by any foreclosure
or other proceedings or notice of sale relating to the property, nor by
any change in the title or ownership of the property, nor by the
occupation of the premises for purposes more hazardous than are permitted by this policy; Provided, that in case the mortgagor or owner
shall neglect to pay any premium due under this policy, the mortgagee
(or trustee) shall on demand pay the same.
"Provided also, that the mortgagee (or trustee) shall notify this
company of any change of ownership or occupancy or increase of hazard
which shall come to the knowledge of said mortgagee (or trustee)
and, unless permitted by this policy, it shall be noted thereon and the
mortgagee (or trustee) shall, on demand, pay the premium for such
increased hazard for the term of the use thereof; otherwise this policy
shall be null and void.
"This company reserves the right to cancel this policy at any time
as provided by its terms, but in such case this policy shall continue
in force for the benefit only of the mortgagee (or trustee) for ten
days after notice to the mortgagee (or trustee) of such cancellation,
and shall then cease, and this company shall have the right, on like
notice, to cancel this agreement.
"Whenever this company shall pay the mortgagee (or trustee) any
sum for loss or damage under this policy and shall claim that, as to
the mortgagor or owner, no liability therefor existed, this company
shall, to the extent of such payment, be thereupon legally subrogated
to all the rights of the party to whom such payment shall be made,
under all securities held as collateral to the mortgage debt or may,
at its option, pay to the mortgagee (or trustee) the whole principal
due or to grow due on the mortgage with interest, and shall thereupon
receive a full assignment and transfer of the mortgage and of all
such other securities; but no subrogation shall impair the right of
the mortgagee (or trustee) to recover the full amount of claim."1
9 Blinkoff, Rights of Mortgagee Under Standard Mortgage Clause in Insurance Policy (1934), 17 Cor. L. Q. 151, 158; The Standard Mortgage Clause
in Fire Insurance Policies (1933), 33 Col. L. Rev. 305-316.
10 The Standard Mortgage Clause in Fire Insurance Policies (1933), 33
Col. L. Rev. 305-316; Huebner, Property Insurance (1928), 53-55.
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This clause is, of course, dated, signed by the company, and attached
to the policy of the insured mortgagor, thereby becoming a part
thereof."
Much confusion has arisen concerning the effect of the conduct of
the mortgagor on the rights of the mortgagee where there is attached
to the policy some such clause as the 'loss payable' or 'standard
mortgage' clauses, directing payment of the proceeds to the mortgagee.
Most of this confusion has grown out of the various decisions involving
'loss payable' clauses and the attempts to apply them to the 'standard
mortgage' clause.12 However, there is a clear distinction between these
two clauses and the amount of protection afforded by each. The
'standard mortgage' clause is held to constitute a separate contract for
the protection of the mortgagee, whereas no such separate contract
exists by reason of the 'loss payable' clause. Under the latter the
rights of the mortgagee are entirely dependent upon the conduct of
the insured mortgagor, and are subject to the provisions of the mortgagor's policy. 13 On the other hand, under the 'standard mortgage'
clause the mortgagee is provided with almost impregnable safeguards
against the forfeiture or diminution of insurance benefits by the act
or neglect of the mortgagor by an express provision to that effect
14
therein contained.
The legal effect given to the 'standard mortgage' clause by the courts
makes the mortgagee independent of the acts or neglect of the mortgagor. This provision is construed to mean that none of the rights
of the former can be vitiated by the conduct of the latter. 15 This
protection extends not only to fraudulent, or wrongful conduct on
the part of the rortgagor, but also to the making of repairs by the
mortgagor, the entering of an appraisal agreement by him without the
consent of the mortgagee, 1 and to his taking out of additional insurance
without the consent of the mortgagee where the mortgage clause provides
11 Huebner, Property Insurance (1928), 55.
12 Vance, Insurance (2d. ed., 1930), 656; 10 Wis. L. Rev. 40-53.
13 3 Words and Phrases, 541; Smith v. Germania Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y.
(1922), 102 Ore. 569, 202 P 1088; Franklin Insurance Co. v. Wolff (1899),
23 Ind. App. 549, 54 N. E. 772, 38 A. L. R. 368; Carlile v. Home Mut. Ins.
Assn. (1934), 254 N. W. 805 (Iowa), (no recovery by mortgagee under losspayable clause where arson was committed by mortgagor).
14Blinkoff, Rights of Mortgagee Under Standard Mortgage Clause in
Insurance Policy (1934), 17 Cor. L. Q. 151-158; The Standard Mortgage
Clause in Fire Insurance Policies (1933), 33 Col. L. Rev. 305-316.
15 Beaver Falls Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Allemania Fire Ins. Co. (1921),
305 Pa. 290, 157 A. 616.
16 Saverese v. Ohio Farmer's Ins. Co. (1932), 260 N. Y. 45, 182 N. E. 665
(repairs by mortgagor); Payne v. Bankers' & Shippers' Ins. Co. of N. Y.
(1934), 77 S. W. (2d) 183 (Mo.) (Adjustment between mortgagor and insurer
without consent of mortgagee).
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for contribution. 17 In order to guarantee this protection to the mortgagee, the courts almost universally hold that such a clause constitutes
a separate and independent contract of insurance between the insurance
company and the mortgagee. Thus, the mortgagee's protection depends
only upon his own conduct.18
Such a clause contemplates the possibility of foreclosure and provides
full protection to the mortgagee or his assignee during such foreclosure.1 9
The insurer is not entitled to assert against the mortgagee the defenses
relating to sole and unconditional ownership interposed against the
insured, 2 0 nor, by the weight of authority, any other defenses interposed
against the insured.
However, the mortgagee's immunity against defenses raised by the
misconduct of the insured mortgagor is recognized universally only
where such misconduct takes place subsequently to the issuance of the
insurance policy. 21 In other words, there are two lines of authority
concerning the effect of the acts of the mortgagor on the rights of
the mortgagee under the 'standard mortgage' clause.
Under the
majority view the mortgagee is protected against all acts of the mortgagor regardless of whether they occurred prior to, at the time of, or
subsequently to the inception of the insurance policy. 2 2 Under the
Canadian view and that of a strong minority in the United States
the mortgagee is protected only against the acts or neglect of the mortgagor which occur subsequently to the issuance of the policy. 23 The
two views arose from a difference in interpretation of the provision
17 Eddy v. London Assur. Co. (1894), 143 N. Y. 311, 38 N. E. 307, Huebner,
Property Insurance (1928), 61, 62.
18Best's Insurance News (Aug. 20, 1929), 226, 227, Syndicate Ins. Co. v.
Bohn (1894), 65 F 176 (Neb.); Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Bailey (1918),
19 Ariz. 580, 586, 173 P 1052; Magoun v. Firemen's Ins. Co. (1902), 86 Minn.
486, 490, 91 N. W 5, 7, Federal Land Bank v. Atlas Assur. Co. (1924),
188 N. C. 747, 748, 125 S. E. 631, 633; Goldstein v. Nat. Liberty Ins. Co.
(1931), 256 N. Y. 26, 29, 175 N. E. 359, 360; Cooley, Briefs on Insurance

(2d. ed., 1927), 1269, 1288, 1988, 1989, 2390; The Standard Mortgage Clause
in Fire Insurance Policies (1933), 33 Col. L. Rev. 305-316, Stockton v. Atlantic
Fire Ins. Co. (1934), 207 N. C. 43, 175 S. E. 695, National Fire Ins. Co. v.
Finerty Inv. Co. (1934), 38 P (2d) 496 (Okla.).
19 National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn. v. Finerty Inv. Co. (1934),
38 P. (2d) 496 (Okla.).
20 Galliotti v. Continental Ins. Co. (1933), 273 N. Y. S. 29.
21Blinkoff, Rights of Mortgagee Under Standard Mortgage Clause in
Insurance Policy (1934), 17 Cor. L. Q. 151-158.
22 Goldstein v. Nat. Liberty Ins. Co. of Am. (1931), 256 N. Y. 26, 175
N. E. 359; Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Bohn (1894), 65 F. 176 (Neb.), Richards,
Insurance (3d ed., 1910), 394.
23Biinkoff, Rights of Mortgagee Under Standard Mortgage Clause in
Insurance Policy (1934), 17 Cor. L. Q. 152.
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in the 'standard mortgage' clause that no act or neglect of the mortgagor
shall affect the rights of the mortgagee, and both are based on New
York cases. 24

By extending the doctrine of the one case, the Hastings

case, the majority of the courts of the United States have reached
the conclusion that the 'standard mortgage' clause protects the mortgagee
against any act of the mortgagor whether committed prior to, at the
time of, or subsequently to the inception of the policy of insurance.
By extending the doctrine of the other case, the Graham case, the
minority have decided that the provision that no act. or neglect of
the mortgagor shall affect the rights of the mortgagee does not include
fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, and other conduct of the mortgagor prior to or at the time of the inception of the policy. 25
Although the courts have failed to rationalize the 'standard mortgage'
clause and thereby explain and harmonize their holdings, it seems
that two factors have been of predominant influence bringing about
the decisions now existing. First, the protection of the mortgagee
has been uppermost in the minds of the courts in construing the clause. 26
Second, as heretofore mentioned, the confusion that arose under the
'loss payable' clause is still present in the law and has no little influence
on the interpretation -of the 'standard mortgage' clause. To secure
the protection intended by the 'standard' clause and to avoid the
problems involved by the 'loss payable' clause, the courts seemingly
have grasped for two straws of distinction, the idea of an independent
contract of insurance between the insurer and the mortgagee, and,
in partial support thereof, the provision in the clause that no act or
neglect of the mortgagor shall invalidate the interest of the mortgagee.
24 Blinkoff, Rights of Mortgagee Under Standard Mortgage Clause in
Insurance Policy (1934), 17 Cor. L. Q. 153, Hastings v. Westchester Fire Ins.
Co. (1878), 73 N. Y. 141; Graham v. Firemen's Ins. Co. (1881), 87 N. Y. 69.
The majority follows the Hastings case which held that a mortgagee was not
bound by a contribution clause in the mortgagor's policy since the procuring
of other insurance prior to the attachment of the mortgage clause constituted
an act of the mortgagor against which the mortgagee was protected by the
protective provision of the mortgage clause. The minority follows the Graham
case which held that the mortgagee was not protected against a misrepresentation as to ownership by the insured mortgagor, the court saying, "The
clause contemplates a case where the mortgagor could act or neglect and not
a case where the policy was issued in the name of an infant, who by reason
of incapacity, could not furnish any protection to the company whatever,"
and saying that such a policy obtained through misrepresentation as to the
owner cannot be fairly considered as within the meaning of the clause, nor
can it be regarded as an act or neglect within the terms of the policy.
25 Blinkoff, Rights of Mortgagee Under Standard Mortgage Clause in
Insurance Policy (1934), 17 Cor. L. Q. 153, 154.
26 Blinkoff, Rights of Mortgagee Under Standard Mortgage Clause in
Insurance Policy (1934), 17 Cor. L. Q. 157.
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Very little, if any, attempt at analysis has been made, the end apparently being considered sufficient justification for the means. Herein
lies the problem of interpreting the 'standard mortgage' clause.
The courts have given various reasons for holding the 'standard
mortgage' clause to constitute an independent contract between the
insurer and the mortgagee, but most of them are insufficient. Some
courts have said that the provisions for subrogation,27 or for payment
of the premiums by the mortgagee on default of the mortgagor provide
consideration, 28 but such cannot be the case since these provisions are
held to be conditions and not covenants on the part of the mortgagee ;29
that being the case, the mortgagee owes no duty to the insurer which
would constitute consideration."0 Other courts have said that the
promise of the mortgagor amounts to consideration for the contract
between the insurer and the mortgagee, 3 ' but such cannot be true
unless there is an agency relation between the mortgagee and the
mortgagor wherein the latter is the agent of the former.82 Further,
unless there is an agency relation there can be no offer and acceptance,
no privity of contract, between the insurer and the mortgagee since
the 'standard mortgage' clause is usually endorsed on the policy at the
request of the insured mortgagor.3 3 Consequently, the 'standard mortgage' clause does not constitute a contract between the insurer and
mortgagee separate and independent from the mortgagor. However,
it does constitute a contract of insurance for the mortgagee separate
from, and independent of, the contract of insurance for the mortgagor.
That is, the mortgage clause is an insurance of the mortgagee's interest
for his benefit, and the policy is an insurance of the mortgagor's interest
for his benefit. So far as the writer has been able to determine there
has been no rationale adopted or suggested by the courts that satisfactorily solves the problems presented by the 'standard mortgage' clause.
However, two theories have been suggested at rare intervals which
are worthy of mention, namely, that of a third party creditor-beneficiary
27 Hastings v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. (1878), 73 N. Y. 141.
28 Union Trust Co. v. Philadelphia Fire and Marine Ins. Co. (1929),

127

Me. 528, 537, 145 A. 243, 248.
29 Home Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co. (1917), 40 R. I. 367, 374, 100 A.
1010, 1012; Coykendell -v. Blackmer (1914), 161 App. Div. 11, 146 N. Y. S.
631, Acuff Co. v. Bankers' Trust Co. (1928), 157 Tenn. 99, 7 S. W (2d) 52;
Farnsworth v. Riverton Wyoming Co. (1926),

30 The Standard
Col. L. Rev. 305-316.
31 Home Ins. Co.
32 The Standard
Col. L. Rev. 305-316.
33 The Standard
Col. L. Rev. 305-316.

35 Wyo. 334, 249 P

555.

Mortgage Clause in Fire Insurance Policies (1933),

33

v. Union Trust Co. (1917), 40 R. I. 374, 100 A. 1012.
Mortgage Clause in Fire Insurance Policies (1933), 33
Mortgage Clause in Fire Insurance Policies (1933),

33
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contract, and that of agency. Under either of these the close relation
existing between the mortgagor and the mortgage clause can be distinguished from the similarly close relation existing between him and
the insurance policy.
Since the clause is usually attached at the request of the insured
mortgagor, it follows that the elements of a third party creditorbeneficiary contract are present. 34 "Where a third party is a creditor
of the promisee, or has a right against him for some particular performance, the purpose with which the promisee contracts with the
promisor may be to induce the latter to pay the debt or otherwise
discharge the third party's claims. In such a case performance will
directly benefit both the third party (the cieditor or claimant) and
the promisee." 35 This analysis has been suggested, but there seem
36
to be few cases recognizing it.
On the face of it this seems to be
the best rationale for several reasons: In the first place, none of the
above objections apply; namely, no consideration moving from the
mortgagee to the insurer is necessary since there is no such requirement
37
on the part of a beneficiary under a third party beneficiary contract.
No agency relation is necessary for the payment of premiums by the
mortgagor to constitute consideration since the mortagor and the insurer
are the sole parties under the theory of a third party creditor-beneficiary
contract, 38 although such relation would be necessary were the mortgagee
a party to the contract. By their agreement the parties (insurer and
mortgagor) make the promise to pay the premium the consideration
for both the contract to insure the mortgagor, and the contract to
insure the mortgagee. No offer and acceptance, or privity of contract,
is necessary as between the mortgagee and the insurer since they are
beneficiary and promissory.3 9 In the second place, it accounts for the
mortgagee's capacity to make a valid assignment of his interests without
the consent of the insurer, 40 and, in the third place, there is no direct
34The Standard Mortgage Clause in Fire Insurance Policies (1933), 33
Col. L. Rev. 307, 308; See, Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons,
and Williston, Contratts for the Benefit of a Third Person, in Selected Readings
in the Law of Contracts (1931), 648, 652, 653; 619, 628, 629.
35 Anson, Contracts (1930), 365.
38
Walker v. Queen Ins. Co. (1926), 36 S. C. 144, 162, 134 S. E. 263, 269;
State Bank of Chilton v. Citizens Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (1934), 252 N. W 164
(Wis.).
37Anson, Contracts (1930), 369, 374.
38 Anson, Contracts (1930), 369.
3
9Lawrence v. Fox (1859), 20 N. Y. 268, 33 Col. L. Rev. 307.
40 33 Col. L. Rev. 308; Key v. Continental Ins. Co. (1903), 101 Mo. App.
344, 77 S. W. 162; Central Union Bank v. N. Y. Underwriters Ins. Co. (1931),
52 F. (2d) 825 (S. C.); rhe Standard Mortgage Clause in Fire Insurance
Policies (1933), 33 Col. L. Rev. 305-316.
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contractual relationship between the insurer and the mortgagee, 41 yet
the mortgagee has an enforceable right.42 However, there are several
grave objections to the third party creditor-beneficiary contract as the
rationale of the 'standard mortgage' clause.
On the other hand, it frequently happens as a matter of fact that
the mortgagee requests the mortgagor or insurer that the 'standard
mortgage' clause be attached to the mortgagor's policy. Invariably
the mortgagor knows of such request and assents thereto. Consequently,
there can be either an implied or an express agency relation between
the mortgagee as principal and the mortgagor as agent. By analyzing
the negotiations this way, the mortgage clause constitutes a separate
and independent contract of insurance between the mortgagee and the
insurer. As to the aforementioned objections to the 'standard mortgage'
clause as a separate and independent contract between the insurer
and the mortgagee -first, the consideration is contained in the premium
paid by the mortgagor on his policy. By agreement the parties can
adopt part thereof as the consideration for the separate contract entered
into by the mortgagor as agent for the mortgagee. Second, offer and
acceptance, or privity of contract, is secured by means of the agency
relation. Thus the 'standard mortgage' clause can constitute a contract
between the insurer and the mortgagee, and it is separate and independent from the policy of the mortgagor, for the parties thereto are
not the same. However, as in the third party creditor-beneficiary
rationale, the contract is not independent and separate from the mortgagor, for as agent he can bind the mortgagee, his principal, by his
conduct. If his conduct as and while agent is improper, the separate
contract set out in the mortgage clause may be invalid, for the acts
of the agent are the acts of the principal. The conduct of the mortgagor
with reference to his own policy of insurance alone, of course, has no
effect on the mortgage clause contracL With respect to that insurance
contract the mortgagor acts, not as the mortgagee's agent, but as the
principal party thereto.
Although perhaps the same result can be reached by either theory,
and although prima facie the problems arising in connection with the
'standard mortgage' clause can be solved by correct application of the
principles of either, they are contra in one respect. That is, under
the third party creditor-beneficiary view, there is no direct contractual
relationship between the insurer and the mortgagee, whereas under
the agency view, there is a direct contractual relationship between
them. However, this conflict is immaterial with regard to the result
reached by each theory.
41 33 Col. L. Rev. 309; Central Union Bank v. N. Y. Underwriters Ins.
Co. (1931), 52 F (2d) 825 (S. C.).
42Anson, Contracts (1930), 365, Lawrence v. Fox (1859), 20 N. Y. 268.
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By rationalizing the 'standard mortgage' clause as either a third party
creditor-beneficiary contract, or as a separate and independent contract
formed by means of agency, the grounds of difference responsible for
the split of authority as to the effect of the mortgagor's acts on the
rights of the mortgagee when committed (or omitted) prior to or at
the time of the inception of the insurance contract are destroyed. The
faults of each view are eliminated while the advantages are retained.
Under either of such rationales only that conduct on the part of the
mortgagor which is directly involved in the formation of the contract
of insurance for the benefit of the mortgagee can affect the protection
given under the mortgage clafise;43 that conduct on the part of the
mortgagor which pertains solely to the formation and maintenance of
his own policy of insurance can have no effect whatever on the rights
of the mortgagee under the 'standard mortgage' clause. In other
words, improper conduct on the part of the mortgagor at the inception
of and with respect to his policy may render it voidable or invalid,
but such conduct has no effect on the mortgage clause unless it was
influential in securing the attachment of the clause; that is, unless the
misconduct of the mortgagor induced the insurer to promise to perform
the contract for the benefit of the mortgagee, which contract is evidenced
by the 'standard mortgage' clause, such misconduct has no effect thereon.
Thus, as the weight of authority holds, the mortgagee is protected
against any acts of the mortgagor whether they occurred prior to,
at the time of, or subsequently to the inception of the policy of insurance,
but this is true only if such acts did not constitute inducement for the
formation of the contract set out in the mortgage clause. Also, as
the minority holds, fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or other
misconduct prior to or at the time of the inception of the policy render
the mortgage clause unenforceable, but only when the inception of
the mortgage clause contract occurred at the time of the inception
of the policy and, being a part of the same transaction, was dependent
upon the identical circumstances for its formation. In other words
fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or other misconduct on the
part of the mortgagor prior to or at the time of the inception of
the mortgage clause contract when, and only when, inducive to that
contract regardless of and independent from the mortgagor's policy,
vitiates the 'standard mortgage' clause.
It goes without saying that under the third party creditor-beneficiary
contract rationale that as soon as the right of the mortgagee beneficiary
is in existence, it is beyond the power of the mortgagor promisee to
destroy such by wrongful conduct that would discharge the promisor's
(insurer's) duty to himself. 44 Under the agency rationale, since the
43Anson, Contracts (1930), 378.
44 Anson, Contracts (1930), 378.
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agency relation between the mortgagee and the mortgagor is only for
the purpose of securing the attachment of the mortgage clause, the
mortgagor's authority and power to change the legal relations of the
mortgagee is terminated when that purpose is accomplished. Consequently the basis for the two lines of authority is destroyed. Under
either of these analyses, it seems that the mortgagee is protected, but
he, instead of the insurer, bears the risk of the mortgagor's conduct
at the inception of the mortgage clause contract. 4 5 In other words,
the insurer does not assume the mortgagee's risk without a contract
to that effect.
Although the correct and desirable result can be reached by either
theory, there are serious objections to both the agency and, as heretofore
suggested, the third party creditor-beneficiary analyses. The adoption
of the former would be a step backwards rather than one forwards.
It would indicate a reversion to the old and by no means obsolete
habit of categorization, or of 'pigeon holing' new problems into the
existing, or so-called static, shelves of the law. The common law
practice of fabrication, or resorting to fiction, would of necessity be
revived, for there is seldom a clear cut agency relation existing in the
creation of the mortgage clause contract. Since the use of this legal
excuse or alibi for distorting facts is unnecessary, it seems highly inadvisable to rely upon it. It is true that in some, and perhaps many
instances, there is an actual agency relation existing, but it is equally
true that in other instances, and perhaps a greater number thereof,
there is no actual agency, nor even an intention to create an agency
relation.
It seems unnecessary to attempt to 'squeeze' this latter
class of cases into a theory which fits only the former class.
The adoption of the latter theory, that of the third party creditorbeneficiary contract, is subject, though to a less degree, to the same
objection of 'pigeon holing.' The objection is not so strong in this
case because the mortgage clause can be correctly interpreted to constitute a third party creditor-beneficiary contract. 46 However, the
principles upon which the 'standard mortgage' clause is based are not
synonymous with those supporting the third party creditor-beneficiary
contract. The bases of the 'standard mortgage' clause are the protection
of the mortgagee and the avoidance of the undesirable consequences

of the 'loss payable' clause, as hereinbefore submitted. These principles
are universally applicable, whereas some states do not recognize the
third party beneficiary contract. Further, such analysis probably could
not cover all contingencies without violation of the underlying principles
of the mortgage clause. As is said in the Restatement of the Law
of Contracts, "* * 0 if a contract is conditional, voidable, or
46 Blinkoff, Rights of Mortgagee Under Standard Mortgage Clause in Insurance Policy (1934), Cor. L. Q. 151-158.
46 33 Col. L. Rev. 307-308, Anson, Contracts (1930), 365.
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unenforceable at the time of its formation, or subsequently ceases to
be binding in whole or in part because of impossibility, illegality, or
the present or prospective failure of the promisee to perform a return
promise which was the consideration for the promisor's promise, the
right of a donee beneficiary or a creditor beneficiary under the contract
is subject to the same limitation." 47 By the same authority it is also
said, "A discharge of the promisor by the promisee in a contract or
a variation thereof by them is effective against a creditor beneficiary
if the creditor beneficiary does not bring suit upon the promise or
otherwise materially change his position in reliance thereon before he
knows of the discharge or variation." 48 Thus it can be seen that
the adoption of the third party beneficiary analysis would necessitate
the application of principles not in keeping with the policy exemplified
by the 'standard' clause.
Although, so far as the writer has been able to find, there is no
direct substantiating authority, it is submitted that the 'standard mortgage' clause can be properly and effectively rationalized under the law
of relations. Fundamentally, such clause is merely the definition or
expression of a relation. That relation arises and exists only when
by force of circumstances the interests of mortgagee, mortgagor, and
insurer are placed in such proximity as to constitute a static condition
wherein there is a constant interplay of reciprocal claims and duties
that give effect to certain incidents recognized by law.
The basic analogy of the law in its formative period, the typical
social and legal institution of the time, was the relation of lord and
man, the feudal relation. Continual resort to this analogy has made
the idea of relation the fundamental concept of our juristic thought.
The landlord and tenant relation, domestic relations, the agency relation, the fiduciary relation, the partnership relation, the relation of
mortgagor and mortgagee, are but outstanding illustrations of this
concept. 49 The legal and economic importance of the relation between
the mortgagee, mortgagor, and insurer, created by the insurance of
the separate interests of each of the two former parties under one policy
recognizing such separate interests, gave rise to the 'standard mortgage'
clause. Neither. the progenitors of the clause nor those who have
since adopted it had in mind the creation of a third party beneficiary
contract or an agency relation. They were intending to formulate
the rights and duties incident to the relation in which they found
themselves.
Under this relational analysis the 'standard mortgage' clause may
be regarded as the standard by which the relation is determined. Its
47 A. L. I., Restatement of the Law of Contracts (
48 A. L. I., Restatement of the Law of Contracts (
49 Pound, Interpretation of Legal History (

Handbook of Elementary Law (1929), 300.

), 140.
),

143 a.

), 56, 57, 58; Bowman,
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endorsement on the policy of the insured is the event by means of
which the legal incidents of the relation arise, and by and at the time
of which, the parties enter into the legal relation which results. By
such rationale the universal holding that the insurances of the respective
interests of the mortgagor and the mortgagee are separate and independent is satisfactorily and, it is submitted, correctly explained. The
various reasons given by the courts and the objections thereto are
inapplicable. The problem of the effect of the mortgagor's acts upon
the rights of the mortgagee with respect to whether they occurred
prior to, at the time of, or subsequently to the inception of the insurance
contract is solved according to the same principle as it would be under
either the third party creditor-beneficiary, or the agency rationale
hereinbefore set out. That is, two relations are involved, that between
the insured mortgagor and the insurer which results from the contract
of insurance, and that involving mortgagor, mortgagee, and insurer
which results from the endorsement of the 'standard mortgage' clause.
Conduct of the mortgagor while he is in the first relation can have
no effect upon the rights of the mortgagee after the second relation
arises because the mortgagee is not a party to the first relation. Such
is the case when the mortgage clause is attached subsequently to the
issuance of the policy. With the attachment of the mortgage clause
the second relation, a new relation, arises. The incidents attached
to the old relation continue and those attached to the new relation
are added. Thus the mortgagor can invalidate the insurance as to
himself, but not as to the mortgagee. Where the mortgage clause is
attached at the time of the issuance of the policy the first relation
does not arise, but only the second arises. Were fraud or other misconduct present here, at the time of the creation of the relation it
would, of course, defeat the rights of the mortgagee if he were involved
in it, as an essential incident of the relation, for the insurer has rights
springing from the relation as well as the mortgagee. However, were
the mortgagee innocent, there would be a question as to whose rights
were superior, the mortgagee's or the insurer's. The same question
would arise were fraud involved in the attachment of the clause on
an already existing policy. Although there can be no positive rule
in this regard under the relational theory as there is under either
of the other two theories mentioned, it is possible that in this one
instance there might be a greater interest in the protection of the
insurer than in the protection of the mortgagee. However, the preponderance of interest would be determined by the circumstances of
the case, that is, upon whom should fall the risk of the mortgagor's
conduct at the inception of the mortgage clause. If the circumstances
indicate this to be a risk of suretyship, the mortgagee should bear it,
but if they indicate it to be a risk of insurance, the insurer should
bear it.
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The fact that there can be no positive rule under the relational
analysis is additional reason for its adoption, since it is sufficiently
elastic to cover new situations that may arise, and yet sufficiently rigid
and constant with respect to normal factual situations to be suitable
as precedent for future cases. Further, since the relational incidents
are variable according to factual circumstances, the mortgage clause
would be subject to judicial policy. In this way the principjes behind
the mortgage clause could be effectuated with consistency according
to the state of social and economic affairs.
Two more problems that frequently arise in connection with the
'standard' clause in insurance policies are those of subrogation and
contribution. When there is a loss and payments are made to the
mortgagee under the 'standard mortgage' clause, the mortgagor, if the
policy is not voided as to him, is entitled to have such payments credited
to his mortgage debt. Otherwise there would be double payment to
the mortgagee. However, where the insurer contends that the mortgagor
has forfeited his protection and no liability exists as to him, the insurer
is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee to the extent of the amount
paid him. The 'standard mortgage' clause, as set forth above, generally
contains a provision to this effect. 50 This right to subrogation on the
part of the insurer arises not from its mere claim of non-liability to
the mortgagor but from the existence of facts invalidating the insurance
as to him. Under the 'standard mortgage' clause the mortgagee is
entitled to have the mortgage debt paid in full before subrogation.
When only the first mortgagee is included in the clause, the insurer,
if not liable to the mortgagor, is entitled to subrogation to the rights
of the first mortgagee, including priority over a second mortgagee. 5 1
Where the mortgagor has several policies of insurance on his property,
and only one or a few of them have a 'standard mortgage' clause
endorsed thereon, the problem often arises whether the various insurers
are liable only for their proportion of the loss, or whether the mortgagee
can collect the entire amount of the loss from the insurer that issued
the mortgage clause. Where there is a contribution clause in the policy
(a provision for apportionment of the loss) such clause has no effect
upon a 'standard Inortgage' clause. 52 Because of this general holding,
which is based upon the theory that the 'standard' clause is an independent insurance of the mortgagee's interest, a contribution clause
is often inserted in the mortgage clause itself. This clause is as follows:
"In case of any other insurance upon the within described property
this company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater propor50 52 A. L. R. 278 (Anno.), Insurance Co. of North America v. Martin
(1898), 151 Ind. 209, 51 N. E. 361.

51 (1934), 19 Minn. L. Rev. 125, 126.
52 Huebner, Property Insurance (1928), 60; Hastings v. Westchester Fire
Insurance Co. (1878), 73 N. Y. 141.
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tion of any loss or damage sustained than the sum hereby insured bears
to the whole amount of insurance on said property, issued to or held
by any party or parties having an insurable interest therein, whether
as owner, mortgagee, or otherwise." A 'standard mortgage' clause
containing this added clause is called a 'full contribution mortgage
clause', whereas one without the added clause is called a 'non-contribution mortgage clause'.
There are two lines of authority with respect to the interpretation
of the 'full contribution' clause. The majority holds that the contribution clause is inconsistent with that section of the 'standard' clause
which protects the mortgagee against any act or neglect of the mortgagor, especially where the additional insurance is taken out by the
mortgagor subsequently to the endorsement of the mortgage clause
and without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee. In such
case to give effect to the contribution clause would be to permit the
mortgagor, by his act of securing additional insurance, to reduce the
amount recoverable by the mortgagee and thereby reduce his protection.53 The minority hold that the contribution clause is a limitation
on the general provision for the mortgagee's protection, 54 and therefore
effectuate it. True, securing additional insurance would prejudice
the mortgagee's rights and protection under the 'standard mortgage'
clause if such act could legally have any effect thereon. It is also
true that in a contract parties may specify and limit their obligations
thereunder. Consequently there is a conflict.
By rationalizing the 'standard mortgage' clause under the relational
concept a result that is fair and in accord with the principles underlying the mortgage clause can be reached in this instance. Where
there is a contribution clause involved, the ordinary mortgage clause
relation is changed thereby to the extent of the provisions therein
contained. Upon entering the relation the mortgagee accepts the
incidents thereof; consequently, if facts upon which the contribution
clause operates exist at that time, the mortgagee subjects his rights
as they exist under the ordinary relation to the limitation imposed
by this relation. The mortgagee is protected, but again the risk of
the mortgagor's conduct prior to the commencement of the relation
is upon him rather than the insurer. Further, he can demand a noncontribution clause, or get other insurance if he is unwilling to become
a party to such relation. However, if the facts upon which the contribution clause operates do not exist at the time the 'full contribution'
mortgage clause relation is entered into, the relation is synonymous
53

Huebner, Property Insurance (1928), 62; Eddy v. London Assur. Co.

(1894), 143 N. Y. 311, 38 N. E. 307, Bennett v. Provident Fire Insurance Co.
(1930), 198 N. C. 174, 151 S. E. 98.
54 Huebner, Property Insurance (1928), 62; Federal Land Bank v. Globe
and Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. (1924), 187 N. C. 97, 121 S. E. 37.
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with the normal 'standard mortgage' clause relation, for it is in accord
with the basic principles of the relation to give greater effect to the
provision of the mortgage clause guaranteeing the mortgagee protection
against the acts or neglect of the mortgagor, than to the provision
for contribution. Further, it is submitted that the rights of the insurer
should and could be protected under the relational analysis. Under
this relation it is improper for the mortgagor to take out additional
insurance because to do so would necessarily infringe upon either the
rights of the mortgagee or those of the insurer. As the protection of
the mortgagee is the main purpose of the mortgage clause his rights
are preserved inviolate; as the addition of the contribution clause to
the mortgage clause is to limit the insurer's liability, his rights ought
to be protected too. This could be accomplished by subrogating the
insurer to the rights of the mortgagee against the mortgagor to the
amount of the excess payment under the contribution clause. Thus,
only the one violating the obligations of the relation would be injured.
In Indiana there is no judicial authority as to the legal effect of
the 'standard mortgage' clause in insurance policies. There are no
cases directly in point that have been decided by the Indiana courts,
and in but one case is there any dictum on the subject. In that case,
Insurance Co. of North dmerica v. Martin,5 5 the court said, "There
is no question in view of the well settled principles of insurance law,
but what the mortgage clause in the case at bar constituted a contract
between the insurer and the mortgagee. By this contract the terms
and conditions of the policy relative to the neglect of the mortgagor
or owner of the property, and the prohibition against alienation thereof,
etc., were modified, and the mortgagee was thereby removed beyond
the effect or control of these stipulations and conditions." With respect
to the effect of the time of the commission of the mortgagor's acts,
that is, whether before or after the inception of the policy, and with
respect to the analysis of the 'standard mortgage' and the 'full contribution' clause, Indiana has as yet taken no position. The Martin case,
mentioned above, dealt with subrogation and allowed such, but that
is as close to the subject of the 'standard mortgage' clause as any
Indiana case has come. This dearth of adjudication leaves a field
unmarred by the judicial strife that attended this phase of the law
in some of our sister states. 56 Hence, it may be confidently hoped
that the courts of this state, by heeding the experience of other jurisdictions, social and economic conditions, and their application to the
mortgage clause relation, will develop a clear and accurate state of
the law concerning the effect of the 'standard mortgage' clause in insurance policies.
55 (1898), 151 Ind. 209, 51 N. E. 361.
56 10 Wis. L. Rev. 40-53.

